Regulation of off-network pricing in a nonneutral network by Altman, Eitan et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
20
4.
46
47
v2
  [
cs
.N
I] 
 30
 Se
p 2
01
3
A
Regulation of off-network pricing in a nonneutral network
Eitan Altman, INRIA
Manjesh Kumar Hanawal, INRIA
Rajesh Sundaresan, Indian Institute of Science
Representatives of several Internet service providers (ISPs) have expressed their wish to see a substantial
change in the pricing policies of the Internet. In particular, they would like to see content providers (CPs)
pay for use of the network, given the large amount of resources they use. This would be in clear violation of
the “network neutrality” principle that had characterized the development of the wireline Internet. Our first
goal in this paper is to propose and study possible ways of implementing such payments and of regulating
their amount. We introduce a model that includes the users’ behavior, the utilities of the ISP and of the
CPs, and the monetary flow that involves the content users, the ISP and CP, and in particular, the CP’s
revenues from advertisements. We consider various game models and study the resulting equilibria; they
are all combinations of a noncooperative game (in which the ISPs and CPs determine how much they will
charge the users) with a “cooperative” one on how the CP and the ISP share the payments. We include
in our model a possible asymmetric weighting parameter (that varies between zero to one). We also study
equilibria that arise when one of the CPs colludes with the ISP. We also study two dynamic game models
and study the convergence of prices to the equilibrium values.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The initial growth of the Internet and e-commerce businesses was in the backdrop of
the following “neutrality” principles of providing end-to-end connectivity: (1) content
providers (CPs) and end users paid only the Internet service providers (ISPs) that
connected them to the Internet and not any other intermediate operator, and (2) they
need not know how their packets are transported in the network, but are guaranteed
best effort delivery without discrimination. Indeed, [Hahn and Wallsten 2006] wrote:
“Net neutrality has no widely accepted precise definition, but usually means
that broadband service providers charge consumers only once for Inter-
net access, do not favor one content provider over another, and do not
charge content providers for sending information over broadband lines to
end users.”
E. Altman and R. Sundaresan were supported by the Indo-French Centre for Applied Mathematics and by
GANESH, an INRIA associates program. M. K. Hanawal was supported by the CONGAS European project.
Authors’ addresses: E. Altman and M. K. Hanawal, INRIA, located at the University of Avignon, France; R.
Sundaresan, Department of Electrical Communication Engineering, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore
560012, India.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted
without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that
copies show this notice on the first page or initial screen of a display along with the full citation. Copyrights
for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is per-
mitted. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers, to redistribute to lists, or to use any component
of this work in other works requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Permissions may be requested
from Publications Dept., ACM, Inc., 2 Penn Plaza, Suite 701, New York, NY 10121-0701 USA, fax +1 (212)
869-0481, or permissions@acm.org.
c© YYYY ACM 1533-5399/YYYY/01-ARTA $15.00
DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/0000000.0000000
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:2 E. Altman et al.
Fee
ISP 1
CP 1
CP 2
Internet Backbone
t−ISP 2
t−ISP 1
users users
ISP 2
Fig. 1. Users-ISP-CP connections in the Internet
Arguably, these principles encouraged rapid innovation at the edge of the network
without any interference from the network operators and made the content accessible
in a nondiscriminatory fashion.
Many last mile ISPs have opposed neutrality arguing that some CPs (deriving ad-
vertising revenue from connections to customers) and applications (such as peer-to-
peer or P2P streaming) used their resources without adequate compensation and
that under the neutral policy the ISPs would not have an incentive to invest in
network infrastructure upgrades or expansion. With a view towards encouraging in-
vestment and innovation in broadband services, the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) ruled in 2002 in favor of an unregulated, or a nonneutral, regime
[Federal Communications Commission 2002]. This decision was upheld by the courts
in 20051. This sparked a huge debate on whether the Internet should be neutral or
not2.
In this paper, we shall study a nonneutral regime where a CP may have to
pay the last-mile ISP, a side payment in addition to the ISP that connects the
CP to the internet. This is because the CPs often derive advertising revenues
from their connection to the end users, a connection that is enabled by the ISP.
This form of nonneutrality has been variously called the opposite of “zero-fee” in
[Economides and Tag 2012], “user discrimination” in [Musacchio et al. 2009], and “off-
network pricing” in [Njoroge et al. 2010]. We shall use the terminology “off-network
pricing” borrowed from [Njoroge et al. 2010], and shall study mechanisms for regulat-
ing this pricing.
Figure 1 shows the connection between ISPs, CPs, and end users who are consumers
of content. In this paper, we shall call such end users as internauts. The internauts are
connected to the Internet backbone by the last-mile ISPs. Usually, internauts do not
have much choice of the ISPs – there is either a monopolistic ISP or some times two
1The background leading to this ruling and the subsequent court decision is somewhat nuanced and con-
cerns the regulated digital subscriber line services, regulated due to historical reasons, and the unregulated
cable services. The ruling in 2002 allowed unregulated cable modem services. The 2005 court decision paved
the way for unregulated digital subscriber services as well. See [Peha et al. 2007] for more details.
2Since 2005 however the FCC has been pursuing policies towards preserving a free and open Internet. The
FCC enforced this neutrality principle in the matter of a network operator’s interference with P2P traffic.
This was overturned in a judgement [Tatel 2010], but the courts did not disagree to FCC’s support for a
free and open Internet; see a subsequent statement by the FCC [FCC 2010]. Several countries have already
adopted legislation that guarantees neutrality, including Chile (the first country that adopted neutrality),
the Netherlands, and Slovenia.
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Fig. 2. Monetary flow in a nonneutral network.
ISPs (say ISP 1 and ISP 2). The CPs at the other end are connected to the Inter-
net backbone via transit ISPs3, denoted as t-ISPs in Figure 1. The CPs usually have
agreements with the t-ISPs and make payments in proportion to the bandwidth used.
In the neutral regime, CP 1 only pays t-ISP 1 for connectivity to the internauts, and
not to any other intermediate ISPs (ISP 1 or ISP 2). In the nonneutral off-network
pricing regime a last-mile ISP (ISP 1 or ISP 2) can ask the CPs to pay for enabling
connection to its internauts.
In order to focus on off-network pricing, we consider the abstracted architecture in
Figure 2, where there is a last-mile ISP monopoly (without ISP 2 in Figure 1), and
the combination of CP, t-ISP, and the internet backbone are combined into a single
entity that is marked as CP (if there is only one CP as in Figure 2). If there are several
CPs, then the combination of CP i, t-ISP i, and the associated portion of the inter-
net backbone are combined into CP i (as in Section 3), with CP i having a dedicated
clientele4 (internauts of class i). As our aim is limited to the study of regulations on
off-network pricing, and because these effects are best understood when off-network
pricing is studied in isolation, we do not include in our models other important con-
siderations such as graded QoS, prioritization, investments, recurrent expenses, tech-
nology aspects, other pricing schemes such as flat-rate pricing, etc. Let us first set the
stage by discussing the related and most relevant works5.
1.1. Related works on off-network pricing
[Economides and Tag 2012] model a nonneutral network as a two-sided market6, with
the CPs and a continuum of internauts connected to each other by a monopoly ISP.
They show that if the ISP charges the CPs (side payments), then the ISP’s profit in-
creases, whereas the CPs’ profits reduce, and there are fewer CPs that remain active
at equilibrium. However, social welfare can be higher or lower than the zero-fee case
depending on model parameters. Further, if a social planner is to decide the payment
from the CPs to the ISP, the payment will be lower than that set by the monopoly ISP.
In a similar setting, [Canon 2009] studies investment incentives for ISPs and CPs,
and concludes in favor of the neutral network arguing that there is higher incentive
for more number of CPs and internauts to be active in this regime with greater invest-
ment and higher social welfare. [Njoroge et al. 2010] consider a duopoly ISP market
and bring in several aspects such as investments by ISPs, pricing of CPs, CPs’ connec-
tion decisions, consumer pricing, etc. Analyzing the resulting hierarchial 6-stage game,
3These are ISPs that connect the smaller ISPs to the Internet backbone. The last-mile ISPs connect to
Internet backbone through transit-ISPs. To keep the diagram simple, these are not shown in Figure 1.
4In this context, one could view internauts as applications on real end users’ machines.
5Analysis of nonneutral networks with QoS differentiation can be found in [Hermalin and Katz 2007;
Cheng et al. 2008; Kramer and Wiewiorra 2009; Choi and Kim 2010]. Discussions of legal and policy impli-
cations of network neutrality regulation can be found in[Hahn and Wallsten 2006; Wu 2003; Wu 2004].
6This is a market where the CPs pay the last-mile ISPs with whom they do not have a direct connection.
The market is two-sided because the payment is in addition to payments made to their respective t-ISPs.
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they conclude that in the nonneutral regime the investments will be higher with in-
creased participation of consumer and CPs. [Musacchio et al. 2009] consider a finite
number of CPs and ISPs. They conclude that social welfare is higher in a nonneutral
regime if the ratio of the advertisement revenues to user price sensitivity is either high
or low, and for intermediate values, a neutral regime is preferable. Closest in spirit to
our work, [Coucheney et al. 2012] consider two ISPs competing for internauts inter-
ested in the content of a common CP. If a regulator sets the off-networking price to
maximize social utility, then everybody benefits.
The literature on the economics of off-network pricing is therefore inconclusive.
There are arguments in favor of off-network pricing, or against it, or there are mixed
opinions that swing one way or another depending on the model parameters. This is
perhaps as one might expect in a system as large and complex as the Internet. How-
ever, if a nonneutral regime is to be considered, questions of howmonetary interactions
between ISPs and CPs should take place, and their influence on the internaut behavior,
are worth consideration. [He and Walrand 2006] study revenue sharing mechanisms
between interconnected network operators based on a weighted proportional fairness
criteria. [Ma et al. 2008a; Ma et al. 2008b] propose the use of the Shapley value (which
is known to have some fairness properties [Winter 2002]) for deciding how revenues
from internauts should be shared among the ISP and the CPs. However, these works
do not consider the sizable revenues to CPs’ from advertisements.
1.2. Our Objective and Contributions
Our objective in this paper is to consider off-network pricing, propose two ISP-CP rev-
enue sharing mechanisms, and characterize the ensuing equilibria.
We begin with a two player game (Section 2) where one agent is the CP and another
agent is the ISP. Both players can charge the internauts for content access on a per unit
demand basis7. We study the single-CP single-ISP game in two settings – regulation of
the side payment (1) before the above players set access prices (ex ante regulation), and
(2) after the players set access prices (ex post regulation). We then extend the results to
the case when there are multiple CPs in Section 3. The demand function we consider
in Section 2 (single-CP case) is a simple, linear, decreasing function of the net price.
In the multiple-CP case, demand for content from a CP is linear and decreasing in the
price of that CP’s content, but linear and increasing in the price of other CPs’ contents,
reminiscent of the Bertrand oligopoly [Vives 1990]. We study the equilibria for ex ante
regulation and ex post regulation in Sections 3.4 and 3.5. In Section 4, we study the
impact of a CP having an exclusive contract with the ISP. The paper concludes with a
discussion in Section 5. The paper comes with a fairly large appendix. It includes (1)
a discussion of an appropriate model for the demand function in multiple CP settings
when some flows may drop out thereby freeing ISP capacity for the remaining flows
(Appendices A, B, and C), (2) proofs of main results for the multiple CP case all of
which are quite elementary but at times tedious, and (3) two dynamic models of the
game studied in Section 3 and their convergence analysis (Section G).
Our models are different from other proposed revenue sharing schemes
in [Musacchio et al. 2009; He and Walrand 2006; Ma et al. 2008b]. Following
[Saavedra 2009], our regulation schemes attempt to share revenue according to
a proportional sharing paradigm. Though simple and stylized, our models are
tractable and capable of providing some interesting insights to policy makers. This is
our biggest motivation to publish this work. We invite the reader to look at Section 2,
after the detailed description of the model, for a list of implications.
7Some consider networks with a per unit demand pricing by the ISPs as being nonneutral. But then, many
big ISPs already use per unit demand pricing schemes, for example, $10 per gigabyte scheme [Chiang 2012].
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2. THE CASE OF A SINGLE CP AND A SINGLE ISP
We first begin with the simple case of a single CP and a single ISP. All the internauts
are connected to the ISP, and can access the content of the CP only through the ISP.
See Figure 2 for a payment flow diagram. The various parameters of the off-network
pricing game are as follows.
Parameter Description
ps Price per unit demand paid by the internauts to the ISP. This can be
positive or negative, and when negative, ISP pays the CP.
pc Price per unit demand paid by the users to the CP. This too can be
positive or negative.
d(ps, pc) Demand as a function of prices. We shall take this to be d(ps, pc) =
[D0 − α(ps + pc)]+, where [x]+ = max{x, 0} is the positive part of x.
pa Advertising revenue per unit demand, earned by the CP. This satisfies
pa ≥ 0.
pd Price per unit demand paid by the CP to the ISP. This can be either
positive or negative.
UISP The revenue or utility of the ISP, given by d(p
s, pc)(ps + pd).
UCP The revenue or utility of the CP, given by d(p
s, pc)(pc + pa − pd).
γ Relative weight of the ISP with respect to the CP; 0 < γ < 1.
[Altman et al. 2010a] noted that if pd is controlled by either of the players and is set
jointly with that player’s access price, then the price competition between the ISP and
the CP results in zero demand at equilibrium, which is not favorable to any of the
agents. This motivates us to study the case when pd is set by a neutral third party
whom we refer to as ‘regulator’. The regulator can be a law enforcing agency which
decides the side payment taking into account the market powers of the players as
described below. We consider two interesting games.
The timing for the first game, under ex ante regulation, is as follows.
(1) The regulator sets the payment pd from the CP to the ISP.
(2) The CP sets the price pc. Simultaneoulsy, the ISP sets the price ps.
(3) The internauts react to the prices and set the demand8 d(ps, pc) = [D0−α(ps+pc)]+.
In the second game, under ex post regulation, the timing is as follows.
(1) The CP and the ISP set their respective access prices pc and ps simultaneously.
(2) The internauts react to the prices and set the demand.
(3) The regulator sets the payment pd from the CP to the ISP.
The first game arises when the charges per unit demand can change over a compar-
atively faster time-scale while the CP-ISP price pd changes over a slower time-scale.
The second one is an interesting case when the prices per unit demand charged to the
internauts varies over a slower time-scale, but the CP-ISP price changes over a faster
time-scale. We analyze both models via backward induction and identify the equilibria.
For a fixed ps and pc, the mechanism used by the regulator to decide payment pd
from the CP to the ISP is as follows:
pd∗ ∈ argmax
pd
UγISP × U1−γCP .
8The ISP and the CP set prices for their roles in the service rendered to the internauts. The resulting demand
for content depends on the joint prices only through the sum, which is the total price per unit demand seen
by the internauts.
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The parameter γ relates the market power of the ISP to that of the CP9. Note that in
both the games only pd is set according to the above regulation mechanisms, while the
other prices are set simultaneously and are strategic actions.
In the ex ante regulation game, the regulator sets pd knowing that ps and pc will
be chosen subsequently by the players; UISP and UCP are then taken to be the equi-
librium utilities at side payment level pd (with an appropriate selection if there are
many equilibria). In the ex post regulation game, the players choose ps and pc knowing
how the regulator will set pd subsequently. The following is a motivating list of policy
implications stemming from the results for the single-CP single-ISP games.
(1) In both cases, there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, in a sense that will
be made precise, with strictly positive demand and strictly positive utilities for
the agents. While it is possible that demand can be zero in the ex ante regulation
game, it is always positive in the ex post regulation game with unique equilibrium
prices. For a policy maker, such a conclusion is very useful – ex post regulation
never produces a stalemate zero-demand outcome where no player has a positive
revenue; ex ante regulation may10.
(2) In all cases with strictly positive demand, the internauts pay the ISP. But the
internauts pay the CP only if the advertising revenue is small. Otherwise the CP
subsidizes the internauts. This is natural, of course, yet pleasing to see that the
model bears this out.
(3) If either of the agents has control over pd and sets it jointly with its access price,
the equilibrium demand is zero [Altman et al. 2010a]. None of the parties benefit
from this situation. On the contrary, if pd is under the control of a disinterested
regulator, with timing as in either the ex ante or the ex post regulation game, there
is an equilibrium where every one benefits. This is the key insight gained from our
analysis, that some sort of regulation can bring benefits to all.
(4) Interestingly, if the regulator applies ex ante regulation and the strictly positive
demand equilibrium ensues, the payments by the internauts and resulting utilities
of all agents are independent of the actual value of pd and γ. Any pd paid by the
CP is collected from the internauts and is further returned back to the internauts
by the ISP. This lack of sensitivity of the outcome to the value of pd is a robustness
property that can be quite reassuring to a policy maker who may worry about
market distortions arising from the regulation. It only matters that there is some
regulation, the actual value of the regulated price pd is irrelevant.
(5) For the ex ante regulation game, the demand settles at a lower value and the in-
ternauts pay a higher price per unit demand, when compared with the ex post
regulation game which results in greater welfare (if welfare is determined by the
price that the internauts pay). Again, this is an observation of value to the policy
maker that is interested in maximizing internauts’ welfare.
(6) For the ex ante regulation game, both the players end up with equal revenues. This
attributes equal importance to both players. For the ex post regulation game, they
share the net revenue in the proportion of their relative weights.
9The Spanish ISP “Telefonica” announced on 8 February 2010 that it considered charging Google. This
is an indication that the bargaining power of Google was weaker than that of Telefonica in the Spanish
telecommunications market in 2010. If pd were to be set via a binding agreement between the CP and the
ISP, and the regulator was the enforcing agent, γ may indicate the relative strength of the ISP with respect
to the CP. If γ = 1/2, then the maximization is equivalent to that of the product of the utilities of the ISP
and the CP. This is then standard Nash bargaining outcome [Nash Jr. 1950] for resource allocation, known
in networking as the proportional fair allocation [Kelly 1997]. Ultimately, under ex post regulation, we shall
see that ISP gets γ fraction of the total revenue, thereby justifying its interpretation as market power. The
quantity γ can also be interpreted as measuring the “degree of cooperation”; see [Azad et al. 2009].
10However, see the multiple CP case.
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(7) If γ ∈ [49 , 59], then both agents prefer ex post regulation. For γ > 5/9, the ISP prefers
ex post regulation, and for γ < 4/9, the CP prefers ex post regulation.
(8) Finally, in view of the fourth point above, one recovers the neutral regime in our ex
ante regulation game by setting pd = 0. The internauts are thus indifferent to the
neutral regime and the nonneutral off-network regime under ex ante regulation.
The choice of ex ante regulation game or ex post regulation game in this single-CP
single-ISP depends on societal priorities. Ex ante regulation is robust, makes inter-
nauts insensitive to nonneutral versus neutral regimes, but has the possibility of a
stalemate zero-demand equilibrium or an equilibrium with lower welfare for inter-
nauts11. Our goal in this paper is not to discuss societal priorities, but merely to pro-
vide conclusions as above that will aid a policy maker in his decision making.
With these motivating remarks, we shall now proceed to state these claims in a
precise fashion and to prove them. In subsequent sections we shall study the extension
of the above results to the case of multiple CPs and to the case of an exclusive contract
between one of the CPs and the ISP.
2.1. Ex ante regulation
We first consider the case where the regulator sets pd, knowing that the players will
subsequently play a simultaneous action game where the ISP and CP will choose ps
and pc, respectively. Our main result here is summarized as follows.
THEOREM 1. In the ex ante regulation game, we have the following complete char-
acterization of all pure strategy Nash equilibria.
(a) Among profiles with strictly positive demand, there is a unique pure strategy Nash
equilibrium with the following properties:
—The uniqueness is up to a free choice of pd.
—At equilibrium, we have:
ps =
D0 + αp
a
3α
− pd, (1)
pc =
D0 − 2αpa
3α
+ pd. (2)
—The net internaut payment per demand ps + pc is unique and is given by
ps + pc =
2D0 − αpa
3α
.
Any pd paid by the CP is collected from the internauts and further returned back to
the internauts by the ISP.
—The demand is unique and is given by (D0 + αp
a)/3 > 0.
—The utilities of the ISP and CP are equal and given by
UISP = UCP =
(D0 + αp
a)2
9α
.
(b) For each choice of pd, a strategy profile (ps, pc) constitutes a Nash equilibriumwith
zero demand if and only if the following two inequalities hold:
ps ≥ D0/α+ pa − pd, (3)
pc ≥ D0/α+ pd. (4)
11We will later see in Section 3 that for multiple CPs, the ex post regulation game may have no pure strategy
Nash equilibria for some parameter ranges.
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PROOF. We first observe that at equilibrium, UISP and UCP are both nonnegative. If
not, the ISP (resp. CP) has strictly negative utility. He can raise the price ps (resp. pc)
to a sufficiently high value so that demand becomes zero, and therefore UISP = 0 (resp.
UCP = 0). Thus a deviation yields a strict increase in utility and therefore cannot be an
equilibrium. It follows that at equilibrium, we may take the revenues per demand for
the ISP and CP to be nonnegative, i.e., ps + pd ≥ 0, and pc + pa − pd ≥ 0.
We next deduce (b), which is a characterization of all the pure strategy NE with zero
demand. Consider a fixed pd. If a pair (ps, pc) were an equilibrium with zero demand,
then clearly
D0 ≤ α(ps + pc),
and
UISP = d(p
s, pc)× (ps + pd) = 0.
Moreover, the ISP should not be able to make his utility positive, i.e., any ps that makes
demand strictly positive, ps < D0/α− pc, must also render price per unit demand zero
or negative, ps+ pd ≤ 0. This can happen only if (D0/α− pc)+ pd ≤ 0 which is the same
as (4). Similarly, the CP should not be able to make his utility positive, i.e., any pc that
makes demand strictly positive, pc < D0/α−ps, must render CP price per unit demand
nonpositive, pc+ pa− pd ≤ 0. This can happen only if (D0/α− ps)+ pa− pd ≤ 0 which is
the same as (3). This proves the necessity of (3) and (4). We now show sufficiency. Let
(3) and (4) hold. Then addition of pc to both sides of (3) and some rearrangement yields
pc + pa − pd ≤ ps + pc −D0/α. (5)
Since the left side is the revenue per unit demand for the CP, it must be nonnegative,
and hence ps+pc−D0/α ≥ 0, which upon rearrangement yieldsD0−α(ps+pc) ≤ 0. The
demand d(ps, pc) is therefore zero. Let us now consider a deviation by the CP for a fixed
ISP price ps that satisfies (3). We will show that the least deviation (decrease in price)
that sets the demand at the threshold of positivity results in a negative revenue per
demand for the CP. Indeed, this critical price qc that sets the demand at the threshold
of positivity satisfies the equation
D0 − α(qc + ps) = 0.
Again, addition of qc to both sides of (3) yields, by the same steps above that led to (5),
qc + pa − pd ≤ ps + qc −D0/α = 0.
Further reduction in price to make demand strictly positive only results in negative
revenue and negative utility. Consequently, the CP does not have a deviation that
yields a higher revenue. A similar argument shows that, under (4), the ISP can make
demand strictly positive only if its revenue is negative. It too does not have a deviation
with a strictly greater utility. Thus (3) and (4) constitute zero demand equilibrium
prices.
Let us now search for an equilibrium with a strictly positive demand. Such a (ps, pc)
must lie in the interior of the set of all pairs satisfying D0 ≥ α(ps + pc). As UISP is
concave in ps for a fixed pc and pd, and UCP is concave in p
c for a fixed ps and pd, the
equilibrium point must satisfy the following first order optimality conditions
∂UISP
∂ps
=
∂
∂ps
(D0 − α(ps + pc))(ps + pd) = 0
∂UCP
∂ps
=
∂
∂ps
(D0 − α(ps + pc))(pc + pa − pd) = 0.
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Solving these two simultaneous equations in the variables ps and pc, we see that ps
and pc are given by (1) and (2), respectively. Note that pd is free parameter. Once this
is chosen, the choice fixes both ps and pc. This proves the second item. We shall return
to prove the first item after proving the others.
Adding (1) and (2), we see that ps+ pc is a constant for any such equilibrium. Choice
of pd fixes both ps and pc. This is true for any Nash equilibrium with a strictly positive
demand. Furthermore, any pd that is paid reduces ps by that amount and increases pc
by the same amount. This proves the third item.
The last two items follow by direct substitutions into d(ps, pc), UISP, and UCP.
As a consequence of the observation that UISP = UCP at any equilibrium regardless
of the value of pd, we have
UγISP × U1−γCP
is independent of pd at any equilibrium, for any fixed relative weight γ ∈ (0, 1). The
regulator may thus pick any pd. This proves the first item. (This observation holds even
for zero-demand equilibria). The proof is now complete.
Remarks 1) Every choice of pd can also result in the undesirable zero-demand equi-
libria, and not just the desirable equilibrium with strictly positive demand.
2) For this strictly positive demand equilibrium, the natural choices of pd are those
that make pd = 0, i.e., there is no payment from CP to ISP, or pc = 0, there is no
payment from the internauts to the CP, or ps = 0, there is no payment from the user
to the ISP.
3) If one places the additional restriction that ps ≥ 0, the only effect of this constraint
is that the choice of pd is restricted to pd ≤ (D0 + αpa)/(3α), and the above theorem
continues to hold.
2.2. Ex post regulation
We next consider the case when the CP and ISP decide on their respective prices first,
knowing that the regulator will set the side payment subsequently.
THEOREM 2. In the ex post regulation game, there is a unique pure strategy Nash
equilibrium with the following properties:
—The uniqueness is up to a free choice of either ps or pc. Without loss of generality, we
may assume a free ps.
—At equilibrium, the net user payment per demand is uniquely given by
ps + pc =
D0 − αpa
2α
.
—The demand is unique and is given by (D0 + αp
a)/2 > 0.
—The regulator will set pd so that the net revenue per demand ps + pc + pa = D0+αp
a
2α is
shared in the proportion γ and 1− γ by the ISP and the CP, respectively.
PROOF. As in the previous section, it is clear that the revenues per demand and the
utilities for both agents are nonnegative. If this is not the case, the aggrieved CP or
the ISP guarantees himself a strictly larger zero utility by raising the price under his
control so that demand reduces to 0.
Let us now perform a search for equilibria with strictly positive demand. Such a
(ps, pc) is an interior point among all those pairs that satisfy D0 − α(ps + pc) ≥ 0.
Consider a fixed interior point (ps, ps). The regulator sets pd to
argmax
pd
UγISP × U1−γCP = argmax
pd
[
γ log(ps + pd) + (1− γ) log(pc + pa − pd)] ,
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where the equality follows because the demand can be pulled out of the optimization.
The optimization is over the set of pd that ensure that the arguments inside the loga-
rithm remain strictly positive. It is easy to see that the latter function is concave in pd,
and thus the maximizing pd satisfies
γ
ps + pd
− 1− γ
pc + pa − pd = 0,
which yields pd = γ(pc + pa)− (1− γ)ps.
Substitution of this pd yields
ps + pd = γ(ps + pc + pa)
pc + pa − pd = (1− γ)(ps + pc + pa).
Clearly, ps + pc + pa is the net revenue per demand for both ISP and CP put together,
and the ISP and the CP share this booty in the fraction of their relative weights.
Knowing this action of the regulator, the ISP responds to the CP’s pc by maximizing
UISP = d(p
s, pc)(ps + pd) = (D0 − α(ps + pc)× γ(ps + pc + pa).
This is a concave function of ps, and the maximum is at
ps =
D0 − αpa
2α
− pc. (6)
Similarly, for an ISP’s ps, the CP’s best response is
pc =
D0 − αpa
2α
− ps,
which is the same equation as (6).
At equilibrium, we thus have ps + pc uniquely determined and given by the second
item. A substitution yields that the demand is given by
d(ps, pc) = D0 − α(ps + pc) = D0 + αp
a
2
,
which proves the third item.
The revenue per demand is easily seen to be (D0 + αp
a)/(2α). Further substitution
yields that net revenue is d(ps, pc)(ps + pc + pa) = (D0 + αp
a)2/(4α), a strictly positive
quantity shared in proportion of their relative weights by the ISP and CP. This proves
the last item.
Finally, for any ps, the regulator will set pd to ensure this proportion, and thus ps
may be taken as a free variable. Each ps and pc satisfying the above conditions is a
Nash equilibrium. This proves the first item.
Finally, it still remains to prove that there is no zero-demand equilibrium. Suppose
that (ps, pc) is such that we get a zero-demand, i.e., D0 ≤ α(ps + pc). With ε = (D0 +
αpa)/2 > 0, the ISP can set his new price to
qs = D0/α− pc − ε/α
yielding a demand D0 − α(qs + pc) = ε > 0 and a revenue
γ(qs + pc + pa) = γ(D0/α− ε/α+ pa) = γε/α > 0,
and therefore a strictly positive utility. A unilateral deviation yields the ISP a strict
increase in his utility. Thus a (ps, pc) with zero demand cannot be a pure-strategy
equilibrium. This concludes the proof.
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Remarks: 1) The equilibrium utility for the ISP under ex post regulation is easily
seen to be 9γ/4 fraction of that under ex ante regulation. Clearly then, the ISP prefers
ex post regulation if γ ≥ 4/9.
2) Similarly, the equilibrium utility for the CP under ex post regulation is 9(1− γ)/4
fraction of that under ex ante regulation. The CP prefers ex post regulation if 1−γ ≥ 4/9
or γ ≤ 5/9.
3) Thus, if γ ∈ [49 , 59], both prefer ex post regulation. For γ > 5/9, ISP prefers ex post
regulation while CP prefers ex ante regulation. Opposite is the case when γ < 4/9.
3. THE CASE OF MULTIPLE CONTENT PROVIDERS
We now consider the case when there are several CPs. Internauts connect to each of
the CPs through the single ISP. See Figure 3. The parameters of this game are given
in the following table.
Parameter Description
n Number of CPs.
psi Price per unit demand paid by the users to the ISP for connection to
CP i. This can be positive or negative.
pci Price per unit demand paid by the users to CP i. This too can be
positive or negative.
pai Advertising revenue per unit demand, earned by the CP. This satisfies
pai ≥ 0.
pdi Price per unit demand paid by the CP to the ISP. This can be either
positive or negative.
px Vectors of aforementioned prices, where x is one of s, c, a, d.
di(p
s, pc) Demand for CP i as a function of the prices. See (7) below and the
following discussion.
rCP,i The revenue per unit demand of CP i, given by p
c
i + p
a
i − pdi .
rISP,i The revenue per unit demand of ISP coming from content provided
by CP i, given by psi + p
d
i .
UISP The revenue or utility of the ISP, given by
∑
i di(p
s, pc)(psi + p
d
i ).
UCP,i The revenue or utility of the CP, given by di(p
s, pc)(pci + p
a
i − pdi ).
γi Relative weight of the ISP with respect to the CP.
3.1. Demand function: Strictly positive demands
The demand function for content from CP i is such that it depends on ps and pc only
through the sum ps + pc, the vector of net payment per unit demand from the inter-
nauts. An interesting feature we wish to model is a positive correlation in demand
with respect to others’ prices. Assume that the ISP has a fixed capacity/bandwidth of
W . If CP i and ISP increase their prices for content from CP i, demand for this content
naturally goes down. On the other hand, when the price for CP j content increases,
where j 6= i, the decrease in demand for content from CP j frees up some capacity.
This provides a marginally better delay experience for the internauts of other CPs,
and particularly internauts of CP i. This positive effect creates a marginal increase
in the demand for content from the other CPs, and in particular, an increase in the
demand for content from CP i. We model this correlation effect by setting the demand
functions to be
di(p
s, pc) =

D0 − α(psi + pci ) + β ∑
j:j 6=i
(psj + p
c
j)

 (7)
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:12 E. Altman et al.
ISP
CP InternautsAdvertisers
CPAdvertisers
p d
pa
pa
p d
p c
p s
Internauts
p s
p c
1
1
11
n
n
n
n
Fig. 3. Monetary flow in a nonneutral network with multiple CPs.
provided each of the demands are strictly positive. Here β is the sensitivity parameter
for the increase in demand for CP i content per unit increase in price of CP j content,
when j 6= i.
While (7) is justifiable when all demands are positive, further thought suggests that
it must be refined a little to account for the following. When the price psi +p
c
i charged to
CP i internauts is such that it forces demand di to be zero, then any additional increase
in psi + p
c
i simply continues to hold this demand di at zero. The capacity freeing and
the consequent phenomenon of increase in demand for other CPs’ contents no longer
occurs, and additional price rise for CP i content will have no further tangible effect on
other internauts’ behavior. We shall return to this refinement in the next subsection
after addressing some points on the positive demand case.
Let the evaluations in (7) be strictly positive for each i. If this is placed as a require-
ment, one could view it as a joint constraint on the actions of the ISP and CPs: given
the other prices, CP i will not set too high a price that makes di zero; neither will the
ISP. We may write di(p
s, pc) > 0 for every i as
D0 − α(psi + pci) + β
∑
j:j 6=i
(psj + p
c
j) > 0, i = 1, . . . , n, (8)
which is compactly summarized as follows. Define the matrix An = (α + β)In − βJn
where In is the identity matrix of size n × n, and Jn is the square matrix with all-one
entries of size n× n. The matrix An has diagonal entries α and all off-diagonal entries
−β. Also define En to be the all-one vector of size n × 1. Then the constraint (8) in
matrix notation is
D0En −An(ps + pc) > 0. (9)
Sum up the components in (8) over all i and set the sum price P =
∑
i(p
s
i + p
c
i), and we
see that the total demand is
nD0 − (α− (n− 1)β)P
under the assumption that each di is strictly positive. For this total demand to be
negatively correlated with the average price per unit demand P/n, we must have that
(n− 1)β ≤ α, (10)
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an assumption that we make from now on12. As before we assume that psi and p
c
i can be
negative, i.e., the ISP and CP can pay the internauts for their usage, with a consequent
increase in demand.
Under the constraint (8), UISP given by
UISP =
n∑
i=1
di(p
s, pc)(psi + p
d
i )
is a concave quadratic function13 of the vector of ISP prices ps.
3.2. General demand function
As alluded to above, the demands in (7) have to be refined to account for the lack
of further positive correlation after a demand reaches zero. See the discussion in the
paragraph following the one containing (7). We present the detailed derivation of the
general demand function in Appendix A. For a given price vector p = (p1, p2, · · · , pn),
where pi = p
s
i + p
c
i , the demand for content i is defined as follows:
di(p) =
{
D0 − αpi + β
(∑
j<k∗+1,j 6=i pj
)
+ (n− k∗)βT (k∗ + 1), i = 1, . . . , k∗
0, i > k∗
(11)
where
T (k) :=
D0 + β
∑
j:j<k pj
α− (n− k)β , k = 1, 2, . . . , n,
and k∗ is the smallest index among k = 0, 1, . . . , n for which
pi < T (i), i = 1, . . . , k
pk+1 ≥ T (k + 1).
In the study of problems with linear demand functions of the form (7), the analy-
sis is usually restricted to the price vectors that results in positive demand from each
player. To the best of our knowledge, the above demand function that completely char-
acterizes the demands for any price vector is new. The considerations that lead to this
demand function are given in Appendix A. This generalization is an another modest
contribution of this paper.
To get more insight into the general demand function we summarize the demands
for the case of two CPs. In Figure 4 we plot all the possible demands as a function
of internaut prices (p = (p1, p2)). As shown, we can divide the set of prices into four
regions. A description of the regions is given below.
(1) Denote the vector of net prices by p = (p1, p2). If it lies in the interior of the region
bounded by lines AO and BO, denoted as Region 1, demands for contents from both
the CPs are strictly positive.
(2) In the rectangular region enclosed between lines OC and OD, denoted as Region
2, the demands for contents from both CPs are zero.
(3) In the region enclosed between the lines AO and OC, denoted as Region 3, demand
of CP 1 content is zero and that of CP 2 content is positive. Any point p that lies on
the line AO is such that p1 = (D0 + βp2)/α with p2 < D0/(α− β).
12This condition also arises from assumption (D) in [Bernstein and Federgruen 2004].
13Simple calculations show that the Hessian matrix is−2An. To see that it is negative semidefinite, observe
that−2An = −2α× [(1−ρ)In+ρJn]where ρ = −β/α. The matrix (1−ρ)In+ρJn has 1−ρ as an eigenvalue
repeated n − 1 times and 1 + ρ(n − 1) once, and is therefore positive semidefinite by our assumption (10).
(It is positive definite if there is strict inequality in (10)). Consequently, the Hessian −2An is negative
semidefinite, and UISP is a concave function of p
s.
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:14 E. Altman et al.
O
D
B
C
A
Region 1
Region 2
Region 3
Region 4
d1
>
0,
d2
=
0
d 2
>
0
, d
1
=
0
p1
p2
D0
α−β
D0
α−β
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(4) In the region enclosed between the lines BO and OD, denoted as Region 4, demand
of CP 2 content is zero and that of CP 1 is positive. Any point p that lies on line BO
is such that p2 = (D0 + βp1)/α with p1 < D0/(α− β).
3.3. Timing of actions
The timing of actions for the games are as follows. For the ex ante regulation game:
(1) The regulator sets the side payment from each CP to the ISP, separately and si-
multaneously. This can be positive or negative. In deciding the amount paid by CP
i, the regulator shall bring only that revenue into consideration which is generated
by internauts connected to CP i.
(2) All the CPs choose their price pci . The ISP chooses the vector p
s. All these actions
are taken simultaneously.
(3) The internauts react to the prices and set their demands as per the discussion in
the previous subsection.
For the ex post regulation game:
(1) The CPs and the ISP set their respective access prices pci and p
s simultaneously.
(2) The internauts react to the prices and set their demands.
(3) The regulator sets the payment pdi from the CP i to the ISP. This can be positive
or negative. Yet again, the regulator shall be able to bring only that revenue into
consideration which is generated by internauts connected to CP i.
The case when β = 0 is easily handled in either scenario. The actions of the various
CPs (prices) do not influence each other. Though the ISP’s utility is the sum over all
revenues accrued from access to each CP, in setting the pdi the regulator takes into
account only the revenue generated by accesses to content of CP i. The ISP’s utility is
thus separable, and the problem separates into n single-CP single-ISP problems. The
results of Theorems 1 and 2 then apply. We shall henceforth assume that β > 0.
3.4. Ex ante regulation
Here, we characterize only those equilibrium prices that result in strictly positive de-
mands for content from all the CPs. It is however possible that there are equilibria
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with some demands being zero. Using the general demand function (11), we character-
ize all such equilibria in Sections A.1 and A.2 of Appendix A.
Recall the definition of the matrix An and the vector En, given after (8). The matrix
An has diagonal entries α and off-diagonal entries −β. En is the n× 1 vector of all 1s.
THEOREM 3. Assume α > (n − 1)β > 0 and consider the ex ante regulation game.
Among profiles with strictly positive demand, a strictly positive pure strategy Nash
equilibrium exists if and only if the matrix (An + 2αIn)
−1[D0En + Anp
a] is made of
strictly positive entries. When this condition holds, the pure strategy Nash equilibria
have the following properties.
—The uniqueness is up to a free choice of the vector pd.
—At equilibrium, for each i, there exist constants gi and hi that depend only on
pa, D0, α, β such that
psi = gi − pdi
pci = hi + p
d
i .
—For each CP i, the net internaut payment per unit demand is unique and is given by
psi + p
c
i = gi + hi. Any payment p
d
i paid by CP i is collected from the internauts, and
this in turn is returned to the internauts by the ISP.
—The demand vector is unique and does not depend on pd.
—The revenues per unit demand, and therefore the total revenues collected by the CPs
and the ISP, does not depend on pd.
The recipe for the proof is identical to that of Theorem 2, only with some matrix
algebra. See Appendix D.
Remarks: 1) Yet again we notice that the actual choice of pd does not affect the net
cost per unit demand to the internauts; neither does it affect the equilibrium demand.
It merely affects the way in which the payment by the internauts is split between
CP i and the ISP. The mere fact that the regulator fixed some pd (under ex ante reg-
ulation) suffices to get an equilibrium more favorable than the case when pd is un-
der the control of one of the players and is jointly set with that player’s access price
[Altman et al. 2010a].
2) For concreteness, we give specific results for the case when n = 2; see (60) in
Appendix D. Let τ = β/α. The negative definiteness condition is then τ < 1, and thus
τ ∈ (0, 1). The equilibrium prices turn out to be
ps = −pd + 1
3(1− τ2/9)
[
1 τ/3
τ/3 1
]
pa +
D0
3α(1− τ)(1 − τ/3)E2, (12)
pc = pd − 2
3(1− τ2/9)
[
1 τ/3
τ/3 1
]
pa +
D0
3α(1− τ/3)E2. (13)
An interesting observation from (12) is that when τ . 1, any increase in CP 2 price
causes a reduction in demand for that content, but results in nearly similar in magni-
tude increase in demand for content 1, and vice-versa. The ISP resources thus remain
nearly fully utilized which encourages the ISP to charge a high price, as evidenced by
the appearance of 1− τ in one of the denominators for ps. The price charged by the CP
in (13) remains bounded.
3.5. Ex post regulation
As done previously, the ISP and the CPs will choose their respective prices knowing
that the revenue they earn will depend on the side payment set by the regulator. We
shall present our results for n = 2, due to combinatorial complexity reasons.
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As in the n = 1 case, the ISP and CP i will share psi+p
c
i+p
a
i , the revenue coming from
internauts accessing content from CP i, in the proportion γi and 1− γi. One immediate
observation is that at equilibrium, this revenue should be nonnegative if demand is
strictly positive because otherwise CP i can raise price and force demand to be zero,
change his loss to zero, and strictly improve. Another observation is that all utilities
and the constraints depend on psi and p
c
i only through the sum p
s
i + p
c
i . While this sum
is bounded if the demand vector is to be strictly positive, neither psi nor p
c
i need be
bounded, and so the action sets for each of the agents is unbounded. We shall present
our main result for the ex post regulation game for n = 2 and under a condition on the
relative weights, namely, the matrix H with entries
Hij =
{
γi i = j,
−(β
α
)
(
γi+γj
2
)
i 6= j, (14)
is positive definite. This condition arises to keep the utility of the ISP a concave func-
tion of ps in Region 1 of Figure 4.
PROPOSITION 3.1. Let τ = β/α and n = 2. Then H is positive definite if and only if√
max
{
γ1
γ2
,
γ2
γ1
}
≤ 1 +
√
1− τ2
τ
. (15)
Under this condition, the Hessian of UISP in Region 1, given by −2αH , is negative defi-
nite, and so UISP is a concave function of (p
s
1, p
s
2) in Region 1.
PROOF. H is a 2× 2 matrix and the statement is straightforward to verify by direct
evaluation of eigenvalues and requiring that they be positive. The expression for UISP
immediately yields that the Hessian is −2αH . We omit the details.
This condition (15) holds, for example, when the γi’s are equal and α > β.
Our main result of this section is the following mixed bag. Recall that the case β = 0
was already considered and disposed; so we shall consider only β > 0.
THEOREM 4. Consider n = 2. Let the matrix H given by (14) be positive definite.
Also let α > β > 0. Without loss of generality, assume pa1 ≥ pa2 . For the ex post regulation
game, the following hold.
— If pa1 is large enough so that
pa1 ≥ (2α/β)pa2 + (2α/β − 1)D0, (16)
then there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium with d1 > 0 and d2 = 0. Such
an equilibrium satisfies all the properties of a single-CP and single-ISP equilibrium
given in Theorem 2 withD0 and α replaced byD
′
0 = D0(α+β)/α and α
′ = (α2−β2)/α.
There is no other pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
— If (16) does not hold, there exists no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
See Appendix E for a proof.
Thus even though ex post regulation in the single-CP single ISP case always gave a
unique Nash equilibriumwith the desirable strictly positive demand, the desirable fea-
ture disappears when there are multiple CPs, α > β > 0, and pa1 is not high enough to
satisfy (16). In particular, when pai are equal, there is no equilibrium in the ex post reg-
ulation game. Ex ante regulation continues to yield a unique Nash equilibrium among
those profiles with strictly positive demand vectors. In the case when there is indeed
an ex post regulation equilibrium, under (16), CP 2 is shut out by CP 1. The above re-
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sult corrects an error in [Altman et al. 2010b, Th. 4] where the equilibrium under (16)
was missed.
4. EXCLUSIVE CONTRACT
In this section we study the ex ante regulation game in a setting where one of the CPs
(say CP 1) enters into an exclusive contract with the ISP14. We refer to the pair of
ISP and the colluding CP 1 as the colluding pair and denote it ISP. They make a joint
decision on the prices p1 = p
s
1 + p
c
1 charged to the internauts of class 1. We denote the
sum of their utilities as UISP. The objective of the colluding pair is to maximize their
joint revenue. How they share it between themselves shall not concern us here.
The utilities obtained by the n players in the resulting game are as follows:
UISP(p
s
1 + p
c
1, p
s
2, · · · , psn, pc2, · · · , pcn) =
[
D0 − α(ps1 + pc1) + β
∑
j 6=1
(psj + p
c
j)
]
(ps1 + p
c
1 + p
a
1)
+
∑
i6=1
[
D0 − α(psi + pci) + β
∑
j 6=i
(psj + p
c
j)
]
(psi + p
d
i ),
and for i = 2, 3, · · · , n,
UCP,i(p
s
1 + p
c
1, p
s
2, · · · , psn, pc2, · · · , pcn) =
[
D0 − α(psi + pci) + β
∑
j 6=i
(psj + p
c
j)
]
(pci + p
a
i − pdi ).
It is easy to verify that UISP is a concave function of p
s := (ps1 + p
c
1, p
s
2, . . . , p
s
n) for a
given pa := (pa1 , p
a
2 , . . . , p
a
n) and p
d := (pd2, p
d
3, . . . , p
d
n), and for each for i = 2, 3, · · · , n,
UCP,i is a concave function of p
c
i . Indeed, the Hessian of UISP is −2An which is negative
semidefinite (negative definite when α > (n− 1)β).
The following theorem establishes the existence of equilibrium prices and studies
some of its properties.
THEOREM 5. Let α > (n− 1)β. In the ex ante regulation game with collusion, there
is a unique Nash equilibrium with the following properties.
—The equilibrium is unique up to a free choice of pd,
—The equilibrium price set by the colluding pair is
ps1 + p
c
1 =
−pa1
2
+
D0
2(α− (n− 1)β) , (17)
and for i = 2, 3, . . . , n, the equilibrium prices are
psi = gi − pdi and pci = hi + pdi , (18)
where the constants gi and hi depend only on p
a, D0, α, and β.
—The demand vector, the revenue per unit demand, and therefore the total revenues
collected by ISP and the other CPs do not depend on pd.
See Appendix F for a proof.
Remarks: 1) From (17), the equilibrium price charged by the colluding pair depends
on only its advertisement revenues and is independent of other price quantities. The
more the number of CPs, the higher the price charged by the colluding pair on inter-
nauts of class 1.
2) As before, pd has no influence on the prices per unit demand seen by the inter-
nauts.
14The same situation also arises when the ISP itself is also a provider of content.
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4.1. Price of Collusion
Is collusion beneficial to the colluding pair? How does it affect the noncolluding CPs?
We specialize Theorem 5 to case of two CPs, exploit the tractability of our model, and
provide some explicit answers.
It can be straightforwardly checked that the equilibrium prices of Theorem 5 are[
ps1 + p
c
1
ps2
pc2
]
=
[
0 −1/2 0
−1 τ/6 1/3
1 −τ/3 −2/3
]
·

 pd2pa1
pa2

+ D0
6α
[
3/(1− τ)
(2 + τ)/(1 − τ)
2
]
, (19)
where τ = β/α ∈ [0, 1). The net price per unit demand is then[
ps1 + p
c
1
ps2 + p
c
2
]
=
[ −1/2 0
−τ/6 −1/3
]
·
[
pa1
pa2
]
+
D0
6α(1− τ)
[
3
4− τ
]
, (20)
independent of pd2 as we had observed earlier.
When there is no collusion between the ISP and CP 1, the equilibrium prices in (12)
and (13) yield[
ps1 + p
c
1
ps2 + p
c
2
]
= − 1
3(1− τ2/9)
[
1 τ/3
τ/3 1
]
·
[
pa1
pa2
]
+
2D0(1− τ/2)
3α(1− τ)(1 − τ/3)E2. (21)
[Altman et al. 2011] proposed two relevant performance measures: the individual
single collusion price (ISCP) and single collusion externality price (SCEP). When there
is only one coalition, the ISCP is defined as the ratio of the total utilities of the collud-
ing players before and after collusion. The SCEP is defined as the ratio of the total
utilities of the noncolluding players before and after collusion. Let (ps, pc) and (ps, pc)
denote the equilibrium prices under no collusion and under collusion, respectively.
Then
ISCP =
UISP(p
s, pc) + UCP,1(p
s, pc)
UISP(p
s, pc)
, (22)
SCEP =
UCP,2(p
s, pc)
UCP,2(p
s, pc)
. (23)
Substitution of (20) and (21) in (22) and (23) provides a wealth of information:
(1) SCEP ≥ 1 if and only if
pa2 ≤
3− τ2
2τ
pa1 +
D0(3 + τ)
α(2τ)
. (24)
When (24) holds, collusion between the ISP and CP 1 results in a loss in revenue
for CP 2.
(2) Under (24), both classes of internauts pay lower prices. But the demand for CP 2
content is lower.
(3) For a specific choice of parameters, see Figure 5 for a plot of ISCP and SCEP versus
the advertisement revenue parameter for CP 2. The colluding pair benefits exactly
when the noncolluding CP has lower revenue.
(4) The colluding pair does not always benefit, for e.g., when (24) is violated. See also
[Altman et al. 2011].
We refer the reader to [Hanawal et al. 2012, Sec. 4] for more details.
5. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we studied a model of a nonneutral network with off-network pricing
and investigated mechanisms for regulating the payments between the ISP and the
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Fig. 5. Individual Single collusion price for ISP
CPs. Our main observation is that a mild form of regulation can bring benefits to
all players. We proposed two mechanisms based on a weighted proportional sharing
criterion to regulate the side payments between the ISP and the CPs. In the ex ante
regulation game, where the regulator decides the side payment before the access prices
are set competitively, the internauts do not get affected by the actual regulated prices
between the ISP and the CPs. In particular, when the access prices result in positive
demand, the equilibrium demand and the access prices are the same as in the case of
the no off-network pricing (when pd = 0). From the internauts’ perspective, the mere
presence of a regulator who regulates side payments in the ex ante regulation game
makes the internauts indifferent to the neutral and the nonneutral regimes. In the ex
post regulation game, where the regulator sets the side payments after the prices are
set competitively, price competition can result in zero demand equilibria when there
are multiple CPs. All these observations appear to tilt the balance in favor of ex ante
regulation, though in the single-CP single-ISP setting it leads to higher prices.
In the nonneutral regime vertical monopolies can be formed. We considered a simple
case of vertical monopoly where CP 1 colludes with the ISP. Such a collusion is benefi-
cial to the CP only if its advertising revenues are higher than a certain threshold.
To keep our analysis tractable, we have used linear demand functions that are popu-
lar in the inventorymanagement literature. The biggest benefit of using linear demand
function is that it is tractable, as evidenced by the obtained expressions in this paper.
It is naturally of interest to see the extent to which more nuanced demand functions
may change the qualitative conclusions obtained in our paper.
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A. DERIVATION OF GENERAL DEMAND FUNCTION
With a suitable reindexing, we may assume that the vector p = ps+pc has components
in the increasing order, i.e., p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pn, where pi = psi + pci . For brevity, we shall
abuse notation and refer to di(p
s, pc) as di(p). Common sense suggests that if demand
for CP i content is zero, then demand for CP j content for a j ≥ i must also be zero
since its price is higher. It will be illuminating to study the evolution of the demand
function as the price vector increases from the all-zero vector to p via min{xEn, p},
where x is a scalar parameter that increases from 0 to +∞ and the min operation is
taken component-wise.
For x ∈ [0, p1], we havemin{xEn, p} = xEn; all internauts are charged the same (net)
price of x per unit demand. It is then immediate that all demands are equal, and from
(7), this value is strictly positive if and only if
x <
D0
α− (n− 1)β .
In particular, demand for CP 1 is strictly positive at x = p1 if and only if
p1 <
D0
α− (n− 1)β =: T (1). (25)
If (25) does not hold, the demand for the cheapest content is zero, and our common
sense conclusion suggests that all other demands are also zero. If (25) holds, then at
x = p1, demand for CP 1 is strictly positive. For x ∈ [0, p1), the demand d1 for content
from CP 1 decreased with x. But further increase in x leaves the price for CP 1 content
unchanged at p1, and our observations about positive correlation with respect to others’
prices indicates that d1 must now begin to linearly increase with x for x > p1. This is
illustrated in Figure 6. Thus for x ∈ [p1, p2], we see
d1 = D0 − αp1 + (n− 1)βx, for CP 1
di = D0 − (α− (n− 2)β)x + βp1, for CP i ≥ 2. (26)
At x = p2, the demand from CP 2, given by (26) for i = 2, is positive if and only if
p2 <
D0 + βp1
α− (n− 2)β =: T (2). (27)
When (27) holds, d1 is linear in x with positive slope (n−1)β for x up to p2, and all other
di are linear and decreasing in x with negative slope −(α− (n− 2)β). Again see Figure
6. If (27) does not hold, di = 0 for i ≥ 2, but d1 is set up to the valueD0−αp1+(n−1)βx∗
where x∗ = T (2). All demands are thus set in this latter case. If (27) holds, the former
case, then one proceeds further in a similar fashion until x∗ = pn and all demands
are set, or until x∗ ∈ (pk∗ , pk∗+1] for some k∗, when demands dj = 0 for all j ≥ k∗,
c© YYYY ACM 1533-5399/YYYY/01-ARTA $15.00
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Fig. 6. Demand functions. Abscissa is the parameter x.
and demands di are set with prices min{x∗En, p}. To get an explicit expression for the
demands, let us define
T (k) :=
D0 + β
∑
j:j<k pj
α− (n− k)β , k = 1, 2, . . . , n. (28)
Let k∗ be the smallest index among k = 0, 1, . . . , n for which
pi < T (i), i = 1, . . . , k
pk+1 ≥ T (k + 1). (29)
To further clarify (29), if p1 ≥ T (1) then k∗ = 0; if pi < T (i) for i = 1, . . . , n, then k∗ = n.
In all other cases, the definition in (29) is unambiguous. Straightforward manipula-
tions show that
T (k) > T (k + 1) if and only if pk < T (k), k = 1, . . . , n− 1.
It follows from the definition of k∗ that
T (1) > T (2) > · · · > T (k∗) > T (k∗ + 1) ≤ T (k∗ + 2), (30)
where the last two inequalities hold if the corresponding indices are between 1 and n.
Let us now get back to identifying the demands. Given k∗, we set x∗ such that
D0 − αx∗ + β
∑
j<k∗+1
pj + β(n− k∗ − 1)x∗ = 0;
the solution is x∗ = T (k∗ + 1). The demands are now specified by
di(p) =
{
D0 − αpi + β
∑
j<k∗+1,j 6=i pj + (n− k∗)βT (k∗ + 1), i = 1, . . . , k∗
0, i > k∗.
(31)
This describes the behavior of the internauts for any given price vector p = ps + pc
and models the positive correlation of demand with other internauts’ prices. Figure 6
depicts the procedure outlined above to evaluate the demands when there are n = 3
CPs. The other parameters are D0 = 100, α = 10, β = 2, and the price vector p =
(5, 10, 20). The slope of demand functions in different intervals are also marked. Here
k∗ = 2. The demand of each CP is obtained by noting the respective value of their
demand curve at x∗ = T (3).
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A.1. Equilibria with all demands being zero
We now study the case of equilibria with all demands being zero. Obviously (25) must
not hold; additional conditions are also needed.
THEOREM 6. A price vector (ps, pc) is an equilibrium with all demands being zero
if and only if the following conditions hold for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n:
psi ≥
D0
α− (n− 1)β + p
a
i − pdi (32)
pci ≥
D0
α− (n− 1)β + p
d
i . (33)
PROOF. See Appendix B.
Remarks: 1) Equations (33) and (32) are the same as saying that revenues per unit
demand due to CP i content, to CP i and to the ISP, are at least
D0
α− (n− 1)β + p
a
i = T (1) + p
a
i ,
and this holds for each i. In such a case, all the CPs and the ISP are charging too high
a price resulting in a deadlock equilibrium with all demands zero.
2) When n = 1, (32) and (33) reduce to (3) and (4), as they should.
A.2. Equilibria with mixed demands with n = 2
In order to avoid combinatorial complexities, and for ease of exposition, we focus on
the case when n = 2 and now characterize all equilibria where demand for one content
is strictly positive and demand for the other is zero.
THEOREM 7. (a) A price profile ((ps1, p
s
2), p
c
1, p
c
2) is an equilibrium with d1 > 0 and
d2 = 0 if and only if
ps1 =
D′0 + α
′pa1
3α′
− pd1 (34)
pc1 =
D′0 − 2α′pa1
3α′
+ pd1 (35)
ps2 ≥
D0 + β(p
s
1 + p
c
1)
α
− pd2 + pa2 (36)
pc2 ≥
D0 + β(p
s
1 + p
c
1)
α
− ps2, (37)
where D′0 = D0(α+ β)/α and α
′ = (α2 − β2)/α.
(b) A price profile ((ps1, p
s
2), p
c
1, p
c
2) is an equilibrium with d2 > 0 and d1 = 0 if and only
if the same conditions as above hold with indices 1 and 2 interchanged.
PROOF. See Appendix C.
Remarks: 1) Region 1 equilibria are characterized in Theorem 3. Region 2 equilibria
are characterized in Theorem 6. Equilibria in Regions 3 and 4 are characterized in
Theorem 7. We have therefore characterized all equilibria in the n = 2 case.
2) Conditions (34) and (35) together constitute an equilibrium in case of a single CP
with D0 and α replaced by D
′
0 and α
′, respectively.
3) Conditions (36) and (37) may be interpreted as
rISP,2 ≥ T (2) + pa2 and p2 ≥ T (2)
where rISP,2 = p
s
2 + p
d
2 is the revenue to the ISP from CP 2 content.
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B. PROOF OF THEOREM ??
We first prove the necessity of these conditions. Let (ps, pc) be an equilibrium with all
demands being zero; it must be the case that (25) is violated, and so
ps + pc ≥
(
D0
α− (n− 1)β
)
En.
CP i should not be able to reduce his price, increase demand di to a strictly positive
value, and derive a strictly positive utility. It must therefore be the case that even the
least reduced price qci that keeps the demand di on the threshold of positivity is too low
a price bringing him a negative revenue. More precisely, a price
qci + p
s
i =
D0
α− (n− 1)β (38)
when demand for CP i content is on the threshold of positivity should imply
qci − pdi + pai ≤ 0, (39)
a negative revenue per unit demand for CP i. Substitution of (38) in (39) yields neces-
sity of (32).
We next verify necessity of (33) by contraposition. Let i be a content index for which
(33) does not hold, and so
pci − pdi < D0/(α− (n− 1)β). (40)
Take
ε =
1
2
(
D0
α− (n− 1)β − (p
c
i − pdi )
)
> 0, (41)
and set qsi so that q
s
i + p
d
i = ε > 0, i.e., the ISP revenue from CP i content is ε > 0. Also
set all other psj for j 6= i to high values so that demand for these other contents is zero.
Demand di for CP i content is however strictly positive because, by using ε = q
s
i + p
d
i ,
(40) and (41), we get
qsi + p
c
i = (q
s
i + p
d
i )− pdi
= ε+ pci − pdi
=
1
2
(
D0
α− (n− 1)β − (p
c
i − pdi )
)
+ (pci − pdi )
<
D0
α− (n− 1)β .
Thus (25) holds, and so di > 0. (All other demands are zero). The ISP now has a strictly
positive utility, and the profile cannot be a Nash equilibrium. By contraposition, ne-
cessity of (33) is established.
We now argue sufficiency of (32) and (33). Take a profile that satisfies these condi-
tions. A glance at the proof of necessity of (32) indicates that there is no deviation for
CP i to derive a positive utility. To see that there is no deviation for the ISP that will
yield a positive revenue, let qs be any vector of ISP prices. Without loss of generality,
reorder the prices qi = q
s
i + p
c
i , i = 1, 2, . . . , n, so that q1 ≤ q2 ≤ · · · ≤ qn. If ISP revenue
for content j were strictly positive, then
0 < qsj + p
d
j ≤ qsj + pcj −
D0
α− (n− 1)β
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
Regulation of off-network pricing in a nonneutral network App–5
where the second inequality follows from (33), and so
qj = q
s
j + p
c
j >
D0
α− (n− 1)β = T (1) (42)
for any such j with strictly positive ISP revenue for content j. (T (1) is defined in
(25)). However, from (30) and (29), any index with strictly positive demand satisfies
qi < T (i) ≤ T (1). Comparing this with (42), we deduce that indices with strictly posi-
tive demand have nonpositive revenue per unit demand. The ISP revenue is therefore
nonpositive, and there is no deviation that will yield a better revenue. This proves suf-
ficiency of the stated conditions, and the characterization of all Nash equilibria with
all demands being zero is complete.
C. PROOF OF THEOREM ??
We shall prove only (a). Proof of (b) is similar and is omitted.
We first prove necessity of the stated conditions. Let ((ps1, p
s
2), p
c
1, p
c
2) be an equilib-
rium with d1 > 0 and d2 = 0. Then, from the discussion on demands, we must have
p1 = p
s
1 + p
c
1 <
D0
α− β
p2 = p
s
2 + p
c
2 ≥
D0 + βp1
α
. (43)
Necessity of (37) is immediate from (43).
We next prove the necessity of (36). Since d2 = 0, the current utility for CP 2 is zero.
No unilateral deviation of CP 2 should yield him a strictly positive utility. For a strictly
positive utility, he must reduce his price to make the demand for his content strictly
positive. But even the least reduction in his price that puts the demand for his content
on the threshold of positivity, a price qc2 such that q
c
2+p
s
2 = (D0+βp1)/α should already
yield him a net nonpositive revenue qc2+p
a
2−pd2 ≤ 0. Substitution of the former equality
in the latter inequality yields (36) as a necessary condition.
We now consider deviations of the ISP. We first observe that ISP’s utility must be
nonnegative. Next, given that the price profile falls in Region 4 of Figure 4, the ISP
can reduce the price of ps2 to q
s
2 such that
q2 = q
s
2 + p
c
2 = T (2) =
D0 + βp1
α
(44)
without affecting the demand d1 and keeping the demand d2 = 0. His revenue does not
change, and the price profile (p1, q2) is now on the line BO in Figure 4. The ISP’s utility
is thus
UISP(p1, p2) = UISP(p1, q2)
= (D0 − αp1 + βq2)(ps1 + pd1) + (D0 − αq2 + βp1)(qs2 + pd2)
= (D0 − αp1 + βq2)(p1 − pc1 + pd1) + (D0 − αq2 + βp1)(q2 − pc2 + pd2). (45)
Let us now consider infinitesimal deviations either into Region 1 or along the line
BO, and prove necessity of (34) and (35). The ISP can clearly change ps1 and q
s
2 si-
multaneously to place the price vector in a neighborhood of (p1, q2) inside Region 1
or on the line BO. Such deviations are given by increments u = (u1, u2) that satisfy
u2 ≤ (β/α)u1. Since UISP(p1, q2) given by (45) is differentiable in this region, and there
must be no direction pointing into Region 1 in which UISP increases, we must have the
dot-product
∇UISP(p1, q2)T u ≤ 0 ∀u with u2 ≤ (β/α)u1.
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It follows that the direction of steepest ascent for UISP at (p1, q2) which is ∇UISP(p1, q2)
must be normal to the line defined by u2 = (β/α)u1 and pointing away from Region 1,
i.e.,
∂UISP
∂q2
= −α
β
∂UISP
∂p1
. (46)
From (45), and after noting that rISP,1 := (p1−pc1+pd1) and rISP,2 := (q2−pc2+pd2) are the
ISP revenues per unit demand arising from contents of CP 1 and CP 2, respectively,
we get
∂UISP
∂q2
= βrISP,1 + d2 − αrISP,2 = βrISP,1 − αrISP,2
and
∂UISP
∂p1
= βrISP,2 + d1 − αrISP,1.
Substitution of these in (46) yields that the condition
d1 = α
′rISP,1 (47)
is a necessary condition for direction of increase for the ISP’s utility. We now use d1 =
D0−αp1+βq2, the expression for q2 given in (44), and the definition of rISP,1 and rewrite
(47) as
D′0 − α′(ps1 + pc1) = α′(ps1 + pd1). (48)
Note that this equation fixes ps1 given a p
c
1:
ps1 =
D′0 − α′(pc1 + pd1)
2α′
. (49)
Furthermore, if we can establish the necessity of (35) which fixes pc1, then (48) implies
the necessity of (35) as well, as can be verified by direct substitution.
We now establish the necessity of (35). Consider first an interior point of Region 4.
Small deviation by CP 1 move the point along the abscissa, and if small enough the
deviation keeps the resulting point inside the interior of Region 4. Then d2 continues
to be 0 and d1 > 0. As a consequence, it follows that d1 = D
′
0 − α′p1, where p1 = ps1 + pc1
and the variation here is in pc1. The revenue for CP 1 is p
c
1 + p
a
1 − pd1 so that
UCP,1 = (D
′
0 − α′(ps1 + pc1))(pc1 + pa1 − pd1).
It is thus necessary that the first order optimality condition hold, and so
∂UCP,1
∂pc1
= (D′0 − α′(ps1 + pc1))− α′(pc1 + pa1 − pd1) = 0 (50)
so that
(D′0 − α′(ps1 + pc1)) = α′(pc1 + pa1 − pd1). (51)
Solving the simultaneous equations (48) and (51), we get the necessity of (34) and (35)
among interior points of Region 4.
Now consider points on the line BO. Let us denote the right-hand sides of (34) and
(35) as ps1,opt and p
c
1,opt, respectively, i.e.,
ps1,opt =
D′0 + α
′pa1
3α′
− pd1 (52)
pc1,opt =
D′0 − 2α′pa1
3α′
+ pd1 (53)
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If pc1 ≥ pc1,opt, consider an infinitesimal decrease in pc1 which puts the point in the
interior of Region 4. The left partial derivative is
∂−UCP,1
∂pc1
= (D′0 − α′(ps1 + pc1))− α′(pc1 + pa1 − pd1), (54)
the right-hand side of (50). We then have the following chain of equalities:
∂−UCP,1
∂pc1
= (D′0 − α′(ps1 + pc1))− α′(pc1 + pa1 − pd1)
= (D′0 − α′(ps1,opt + pc1,opt))− α′(pc1,opt + pa1 − pd1)
+ α′(ps1,opt − ps1) + 2α′(pc1,opt − pc1) (55)
= 0− (1/2)α′(pc1,opt − pc1) + 2α′(pc1,opt − pc1) (56)
= (3/2)α′(pc1,opt − pc1), (57)
where (55) follows by adding and subtracting
(D′0 − α′(ps1,opt + pc1,opt))− α′(pc1,opt + pa1 − pd1).
Equation (56) follows because (51) and (48) hold for the pair (pc1,opt, p
s
1,opt), and from
(49) we see that
ps1 − ps1,opt = −(1/2)(pc1 − pc1,opt).
From (57), pc1 > p
c
1,opt implies that an infinitesimal decrease results in a strict increase
for CP 1. It must therefore be that pc1 ≤ pc1,opt for the profile under consideration to be
an equilibrium.
When pc1 ≤ pc1,opt, consider an infinitesimal increase in pc1 which puts the point in
the interior of Region 1, i.e., both d1 and d2 become positive. As a consequence, the
right-derivative is now
∂+UCP,1
∂pc1
= (D′0 − α′(ps1 + pc1))− α(pc1 + pa1 − pd1); (58)
observe that the difference with (54) is that the second term is multiplied only by
α instead of α′ as now both CPs have positive demand upon deviation in Region 1.
Following the same steps leading to (57), we now get
∂+UCP,1
∂pc1
= 0− (1/2)α′(pc1,opt − pc1) + (α′ + α)(pc1,opt − pc1)
= (α + α′/2)(pc1,opt − pc1)
and now the right-hand side has a different scale when compared with (57). When
pc1 < p
c
1,opt, we have
∂+UCP,1
∂pc
1
> 0 yielding a strict increase in CP 1 utility. It follows
that we must have pc1 = p
c
1,opt. This establishes the necessity of (35), and the proof of
necessity is complete.
Next, to address sufficiency of the stated conditions, consider a profile satisfying
them. Our necessity argument for (36) also shows that CP 2 has no deviation yield-
ing him a strictly positive utility. For the ISP, the necessity argument considered an
equivalent point on the line BO, and showed that there are no infinitesimal deviations
around this point that will yield a better utility. But on account of concavity of the
utility functions, no other point in Region 1 (including the boundary AO) will yield a
strictly better utility. Since the boundary AO has also been considered, and the any
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point in Region 3 yields him the same utility as the point on the line AO with the
same ordinate, no point in Region 3 will yield a better utility. Similarly, on account of
concavity, CP 1 too as no deviation (infinitesimal or otherwise) that will yield him a
strictly better utility. This concludes the proof of sufficiency.
D. PROOF OF THEOREM ??
Consider a fixed pd. We shall only focus on strategies jointly constrained so that di > 0
for all i. The joint constraint on ps and pc is given by (8), and the demands are given
by (7). Let us look at UISP as a function of p
s and UCP,i as a function p
c
i . We already
saw that the former is concave since α > (n − 1)β. Inspection of the expression for
UCP,i shows that it is also quadratic and strictly concave in p
c
i . Since we seek equilibria
with strictly positive demand, such equilibria are interior points of, for example in
case of n = 2, Region 1 in Figure 4. It is therefore necessary that first order optimality
conditions hold for such equilibria. So, setting the gradient of UISP with respect to p
s to
zero, we get
∂UISP
∂psk
=
∑
j:j 6=k
β(psj + p
d
j )− α(psk + pdk) +D0 − α(psk + pck) + β
∑
j:j 6=k
(psj + p
c
j) = 0
for each k. Similarly, setting each ∂UCP,k/∂p
c
k = 0 yields
D0 − α(psk + pck) + β
∑
j:j 6=k
(psj + p
c
j)− α(pck + pak − pdk) = 0
for each k. We next write these 2n equations in matrix notation. For this purpose recall
that the matrix An = (α + β)In − βJn, where all diagonal elements are α and all off-
diagonal elements are −β, and define Bn = (α + β/2)In − (β/2)Jn, where all diagonal
elements are α and all off-diagonal elements are −β/2. Also recall that En is the vector
of size n× 1 with all-one entries. Then the above equations become:[
2An An
An 2Bn
] [
ps
pc
]
=
[ −An ©
αIn −αIn
] [
pd
pa
]
+D0E2n. (59)
The matrices An and Bn commute because both are linear combinations of the com-
muting matrices In and Jn. Moreover, the determinant of the matrix on the left side
is
det(4AnBn −A2n) = det(An(An + 2αIn))
= det(An) det(An + 2αIn)
= (α+ β)n−1(α− (n− 1)β)(3α+ β)n−1(3α− (n− 1)β)
> 0.
This follows because the eigenvalues of the matrix
M(ρ) = (1− ρ)In + ρJn
are 1 − ρ repeated n − 1 times and 1 + (n − 1)ρ occurring once. The matrices An and
An + 2αIn are scaled versions ofM(ρ) with appropriate choices for ρ. Thus the matrix
on the left side of (59) is invertible. From the fact that An and Bn commute, the fact
that 4AnBn−A2n = An(An+2αIn), and the formula for the inverse of two-by-two block
matrices with commutable entries, one writes by inspection that[
2An An
An 2Bn
]−1
= (An(An + 2αIn))
−1 ◦
[
2Bn −An
−An 2An
]
,
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where the symbol “◦” implies that the matrix before it left-multiplies all the elements
of the bigger matrix following it. Multiplying (59) by the above inverse, and observing
that 2Bn + αIn = An + 2αIn, we get[
ps
pc
]
=
[ −In α(An + 2αIn)−1
In −2α(An + 2αIn)−1
] [
pd
pa
]
+D0
[
α(An(An + 2αIn))
−1En
(An + 2αIn)
−1En
]
. (60)
Let us now verify that the revenues to each of CPs and the ISP are nonnegative. First
we handle the ISP. Observe that the components of ps + pd constitute revenues from
each family of internauts. From (60) we gather that
ps + pd = α(An + 2αIn)
−1pa + αD0(An + 2αIn)
−1A−1n En
= αA−1n (An + 2αIn)
−1(Anp
a +D0En). (61)
Next, consider the CPs. Again from (60) we gather that
pc − pd + pa = (In − 2α(An + 2αIn)−1)pa +D0(An + 2αIn)−1En
= (An + 2αIn)
−1(Anp
a +D0En). (62)
From (60), it also follows that
ps + pc = (An + 2αIn)
−1(−αpa +D0(In + αA−1n )En)
so that the demand vector d = D0En −An(ps + pc) can be written (after observing that
all involved matrices commute) as
d = α(An + 2αIn)
−1(Anp
a +D0En). (63)
Using this in (61), we see that ps + pd = A−1n d so that
UISP = d
TA−1n d. (64)
Necessity of
(An + 2αIn)
−1(Anp
a +D0En) > 0 (65)
is then clear from (62) and (63). Indeed, if any component on the left-hand side of (65)
is nonpositive, the corresponding CP derives a nonpositive revenue per unit demand,
and the demand for this CP’s content truncates to 0. Such a point is either not an
equilibrium, or if so, not all demands are strictly positive.
Sufficiency of (65) is obtained as follows. If (65) holds, then (62), (63), and (64) yield
a point with strictly positive revenue for all agents and strictly positive demand. In-
deed, from (62), revenue per unit demand is strictly positive for all CPs; from (63), all
demands are strictly positive and consequently, all CPs’ utilities are strictly positive;
from (64) and the fact that A−1n has strictly positive eigenvalues, the ISP revenue is
also positive. Furthermore, this point satisfies first-order optimality conditions. Given
the concavity of the utility functions, it is a Nash equilibrium.
We have thus established that (65) is necessary and sufficient for a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium to exist. When this holds, the pure strategy Nash equilibria are such
that (61)-(64) hold, for a given pd.
Let us now bring the relative weights into the picture. Since the choice of pd does not
affect the demands di(p
s + pd) as in (63), and the collections per unit demand by each
of the CPs and the ISP are as in (62) and (61), respectively, the optimal solution pd to
the sharing problem can be taken as any vector.
It then follows that the unique demand is given by (63) which establishes the fourth
item. The form of the solution for ps and pc in (60) shows that psi = gi−pdi and pci = hi+pdi
which verifies the second and the third items. Notice that pd can be any vector, and so
the solution is unique up to a free choice of pd, and the statement of the first item is
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verified. The last item follows from the observation that the demand vector, the price
charged by the CPs in (62), and the the revenue of the ISP in (64) do not depend on pd.
This concludes the proof.
E. PROOF OF THEOREM ??
The system has two CPs, n = 2. When β = 0, the problem separates into two smaller
problems each with one CP and one ISP, and Theorem 2 applies. We now assume
α > β > 0. It will be useful to recall Figure 4 which has four regions.
1. We now argue there are no pure strategy equilibria in Region 2. This is the region
with both demands zero. Let the ISP prices ps1, p
s
2 and the CP prices p
c
1 and p
c
2 be such
that
p1 = p
s
1 + p
c
1 ≥ D0/(α− β)
p2 = p
s
2 + p
c
2 ≥ D0/(α− β).
Consider the point O in Figure 4 given by (D0/(α−β), D0/(α−β)). ISP can bring down
both his prices to move the price point to O, and demand and revenue collected remain
zero. Now consider further deviation along the line BO. To realise this, ISP reduces
both prices so that the net price denoted (q1, q2) satisfies the equation q2 = (D0+βq1)/α.
Along this line d1 = D
′
0 − α′q1 > 0 and d2 = 0, where D′0 and α′ are given in the
statement of the theorem. But this puts us in a single-CP single-ISP case. By the last
part of the proof of Theorem 2, we see that the ISP has a deviation that yields a strictly
positive revenue for itself. So no point in Region 2 can be a pure strategy equilibrium.
2. We now argue that no point in the interior of Region 1 can be an equilibrium. Let
the prices be such that the total prices on the internauts is (p1, p2), a point in Region
1. In this case
d1(p1, p2) = D0 − αp1 + βp2 > 0
d2(p1, p2) = D0 − αp2 + βp1 > 0. (66)
Clearly, the net revenue coming from internauts i is pi + p
a
i , and so
UISP = d1(p1, p2)γ1(p1 + p
a
1) + d2(p1, p2)γ2(p2 + p
a
2)
UCP,i = di(p1, p2)(1 − γi)(pi + pai ), i = 1, 2.
Since the utilities depend on psi and p
c
i only through pi = p
s
i+p
c
i , partial derivatives with
respect to psi and p
c
i may be obtained by considering partial derivatives with respect to
pi. These are (in Region 1)
∂UCP,i
∂pi
= (1− γi)(di(p1, p2)− α(pi + pai )), i = 1, 2
∂UISP
∂p1
= γ1(d1(p1, p2)− α(p1 + pa1)) + γ2β(p2 + pa2)
=
γ1
1− γ1
∂UCP1
∂p1
+ γ2β(p2 + p
a
2)
∂UISP
∂p2
= γ2(d2(p1, p2)− α(p2 + pa2)) + γ1β(p1 + pa1)
=
γ2
1− γ2
∂UCP2
∂p2
+ γ1β(p1 + p
a
1).
(In passing, we note that from here, it is but a short step to verify that the Hessian for
UISP with respect to (p
s
1, p
s
2) is −2αH). The first order necessary conditions imply that
the above partial derivatives are zero, and we immediately deduce that pi + p
a
i = 0 for
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both i = 1, 2, i.e., the revenue for each CP’s content is zero. Substitution of these in
∂UCPi
∂pi
= 0 above yields di = 0 for both i = 1, 2. But this is contrary to the assumption
that the point is on the interior of Region 1. So no point in the interior of Region 1 can
be an equilibrium.
3. Let us now consider a candidate equilibrium in Region 4, with p1 < D0/(α − β)
and p2 ≥ (D0 + βp1)/α.
Let us consider deviations by the ISP. First, he may reduce ps2 to q
s
2 so that p2 reduces
to q2 = (D0 + βp1)/α so that the resulting point (p1, q2) is on the line BO, and d2 is
on the threshold of positivity, but revenue of CP 1, revenue of CP 2 (which is zero),
and revenue of the ISP still remain unaffected. ISP can now consider deviations from
(p1, q2) along the line BO or into Region 1, i.e., along the vector (u1, u2) where u2 ≤
(β/α)u1. For such deviations to be fruitless, ∇UISP(p1, q2) must point into Region 4,
and must in particular be normal to the line BO, and so (46) should hold, which in the
present case yields
γ2d2(p1, q2)− αγ2(p2 + pa2) + γ1β(p1 + pa1)
= − (α/β)(γ1d1(p1, q2)− αγ1(p1 + pa1) + γ2β(p2 + pa2)).
After cancelations and after using the fact that d2(p1, q2) = 0, the above equality sim-
plifies to
p1 + p
a
1 = αd1(p1, q2)/(α
2 − β2)
= d1(p1, q2)/α
′ (67)
= (D′0 − α′p1)/α′,
solving which we get
p1 =
D′0 − α′pa1
2α′
, (68)
the solution for the single-CP and single-ISP case. It is easily verified that the net
revenue is p1 + p
a
1 = (D
′
0 + α
′pa1)/(2α
′) > 0 and further, from (67),
d1(p1, q2) = α
′(p1 + p
a
1) = (D
′
0 + α
′pa1)/2 > 0,
as in the single-CP and single-ISP case.
Let us next consider local deviations by CP 1 who can increase or decrease pc1 and
therefore perturb p1. From the above argument, p1 must satisfy (68). If (p1, p2) is an
interior point of Region 4, any deviation by CP 1 effectively moves the point (p1, q2), a
point that is effectively equivalent to the original (p1, p2), along the line BO. It is easy
to see, using q2 = (D0 + βp1)/α, that
∂
∂p1
UCP,1 =
∂
∂p1
(d1(p1, q2)(p1 + p
a
1)(1− γ1))
=
∂
∂p1
((D′0 − α′p1)(p1 + pa1)(1 − γ1))
= (d1(p1, q2)− α′(p1 + pa1))(1 − γ1)
= 0 (69)
where the last equality comes from (67). Thus, when (p1, p2) is an interior point of
Region 4, CP 1 does not benefit from a local deviation. When (p1, p2) is on the line BO,
it is just (p1, q2). A decrease in p1 moves the point to the interior of Region 4, and the
equivalent point moves lower and left along the line BO. Then the argument leading
to (69) holds for the left partial derivative ∂
−
∂p1
UCP,1, and decrease in p
c
1 does not yield
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a gain. On the other hand, an increase in pc1 increases p1 and puts the system in the
interior of Region 1, and we then have
∂+
∂p1
UCP,1 =
∂
∂p1
(d1(p1, q2)(p1 + p
a
1)(1− γ1))
=
∂
∂p1
((D0 − αp1 + βq2)(p1 + pa1)(1 − γ1))
= (d1(p1, q2)− α(p1 + pa1))(1 − γ1)
= (d1(p1, q2)− α′(p1 + pa1))(1 − γ1) + (α′ − α)(p1 + pa1)(1 − γ1)
= (α′ − α)(p1 + pa1)(1− γ1)
< 0
where the penultimate equality follows because of (67), and the last inequality follows
because α′ < α, but the other two factors are strictly positive. But this implies an
infinitesimal increase in pc1 yields a strict decrease in his utility. There are thus no
utility increasing infinitesimal deviations for CP 1.
Lastly, we consider infinitesimal deviations by CP 2. If p2 > q2, then CP 2 can bring
down his price so that p2 reduces to q2 without a change in his revenue or without
a change in demand for his content. Any further decrease moves the operating point
into the interior of Region 1, and renders d2 strictly positive. For such a deviation to
be fruitless, the revenue for CP 2 at the operating point (p1, q2) should be nonpositive,
i.e.,
0 ≥ q2 + pa2 =
D0 + βp1
α
+ pa2 .
Substitution of (68) and rearrangement yields (16) as a necessary condition for equi-
librium. If (16) does not hold, there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in Region
4.
4. Consider points in Region 3. An argument analogous to above yields that an
analogue of (16), with indices 1 and 2 interchanged, is a necessary condition. But as
pa1 ≥ pa2 , such a condition cannot hold, and there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium
in Region 3
It is thus clear that if (16) does not hold, there exists no pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium. This proves the second statement. If (16) does hold, we saw above that the only
possible equilibria, if any, are in Region 4 with p1 as in (68), and p2 ≥ (D0 + βp1)/α.
From the first order conditions, no infinitesimal deviation yields a better revenue for
any of the agents. From the facts that
—UISP is concave in Region 1 by the assumption that H is positive definite,
—UCP,1 and UCP,2 are strictly concave in Region 1,
— they extend continuously to the boundaries AO and BO from Region 1,
— for each point in Region 4, the utilities are determined by the utilities on an equiv-
alent point on the line BO, and similarly,
— for each point in Region 3, the utilities are determined by the utilities on an equiv-
alent point on the line AO, and finally,
— the utilities earned in Region 2 are zero,
it follows that no deviation, infinitesimal or otherwise, will yield a better revenue for
any of the agents. So p1 given in (68) and p2 ≥ (D0 + βp1)/α characterize the pure
strategy Nash equilibrium. This concludes the proof of the theorem.
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
Regulation of off-network pricing in a nonneutral network App–13
F. PROOF OF THEOREM ??
Recall our argument that UISP is a concave function in p
s = (p1, p
s
2, · · · , psn), and for
each k = 2, · · · , n, UCP,k is concave in pck. Then, the equilibrium prices must satisfy the
following first order optimality conditions:
∂UISP
∂p1
= D0 − 2αp1 + 2β
∑
j 6=1
psj + β
∑
j 6=1
pcj − αpa1 + β
∑
j 6=1
pdi = 0,
and for k = 2, 3, · · ·n,
∂UISP
∂psk
= D0 + 2βp1 − 2αpsk + 2β
∑
j 6=k,1
psj − αpck + β
∑
j 6=k,1
pcj + βp
a
1 − αpdk + β
∑
j 6=k,1
pdj = 0
∂UCP,k
∂pck
= D0 + βp1 − αpsk + β
∑
j 6=k,1
(psj + p
c
j)− 2αpck − α(pak − pdk) = 0.
Let pc = (pc2, p
c
3, · · · , pcn) denote the CP price vector. The above set of 2n − 1 equations
can be compactly written in matrix form as follows[
2α −bT
−b C
] [
ps
pc
]
=
[
−α cT
a D
] [
pa
pd
]
+D0E2n−1, (70)
where bT and cT are row vectors of size 1 × (2n − 2) given by bT = [2βETn−1 βETn−1]
and cT = [0 · ETn−1 βETn−1]. a denotes a column vector of size (2n − 2) × 1 given by
aT = [β · ETn−1 0 · ETn−1]. C and D are 2× 2 block matrix given by
C =
[
2An−1 An−1
An−1 2Bn−1
]
D =
[ © −An−1
−αIn−1 αIn−1
]
.
The solution to system of equation in (70) exists if the matrix[
2α −bT
−b C
]
is invertible. By inspection we can write its inverse as
1
µ
[
1 bTC−1
C−1b µC−1 + C−1bbTC−1
]
, (71)
where µ = (2α − bTC−1b) and C−1 denotes the inverse of matrix C. For the above
inverse to exist the following must hold.
(i)C is invertible and
(ii) bTC−1b 6= 2α.
We next verify these conditions. Invertibility of C is guaranteed by its definition. In-
deed,
det(C) = det(An−1(An−1 + 2αIn−1))
= (α+ β)(n−2)(α − β(n− 2))(3α+ β)(n−2)(3α− β(n− 2)) > 0,
and it can be computed as
C−1 = (An−1 + 2αIn−1)
−1 ◦
[
2Bn−1A
−1
n−1 −In−1
−In−1 2In−1
]
.
Further, all the terms in matrix (71) can be expressed in term of inverse of matrix An−1
as follows:
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C−1b = β
[
A−1n−1En−1
0
]
, (72)
bTC−1 = β
[
ETn−1A
−1
n−1 0
]
,
C−1bbTC−1 =
[
β2A−1n−1En−1E
T
n−1A
−1
n−1 ©
© ©
]
.
Left multiplying matrix (72) by bT we have
bTC−1b = 2β2ETn−1A
−1
n−1En−1 =
2β2(n− 1)
α− (n− 2)β . (73)
The above relation follows by noting that the sum of elements in each row of the adja-
cent matrix of An−1 and its determinant are given by (α + β)
n−2 and (α + β)n−2(α −
(n − 2)β), respectively. The left hand side in (73) is equal to 2α only when α = β and
n = 2. But, this contradicts our assumption α > (n − 1)β. This completes the proof of
existence of equilibrium.
We next compute the equilibrium prices and the corresponding demand. Rearrang-
ing (70), equilibrium prices can be written as[
ps
pc
]
=
1
µ
[
1 bTC−1
C−1b Y
] [
−α cT
a D
] [
pa
pd
]
+
D0
µ
[
1 bTC−1
C−1b Y
]
E2n−1,
where Y = µC−1 + C−1bbTC−1.
To further simplify the expression for equilibrium prices, we use the relations
2bTC−1a = bTC−1b and cT + bTC−1D = 0, both of which are easy to verify. Using
these relations we get[
ps
pc
]
=
[ −1/2 ©
C−1(a− b/2) C−1D
] [
pa
pd
]
+
D0
µ
[
1 bTC−1
C−1b Y
]
E2n−1
=
[ −1/2 ©
C−1(a− b/2) C−1D
] [
pa
pd
]
+D0
[ −1/2β + (β + α)/βµ
C−1b(−12β +
β+α
βµ
) + C−1E2n−2
]
=
[ −1/2 ©
C−1(a− b/2) C−1D
] [
pa
pd
]
+D0

 −1/2β + (β + α)/βµ
X−1
2 ◦
[ −E
2E
]
+ β+α
µ
[
A−1E
©
]  ,(74)
whereX = (An−1+2αIn−1)
−1, and we used notation A := An−1 and E := En−1 for ease
of presentation.
The product of matrix C−1 and D in the above expression can be computed as
C−1D =
[
αX−1 In−1
−2αX−1 −In−1
]
(75)
Substituting this relation in (74), it is easy to see that equilibrium prices psi and p
c
i
depend only on pdi all i = 2, 3, · · · , n. This verifies the claims in second item. Further,
using (74), it follows that at equilibrium prices paid by each user group can be com-
puted as[
p1
ps−1 + p
c
]
=
[ −1/2 ©
−(β/2)X−1E −αX−1
]
pa +D0
[ −1/2β + (β + α)/βµ
X−1E/2 + (β + α)/µA−1E
]
,
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where ps−1 denotes the ISP price vector without the component p1. The corresponding
equilibrium demand can be computed as
D0En −
[
−α2 + β
2
2ETXE + βαE
TX
β
2E − β2AE − αAX
]
−D0
[
α
2(α−(n−1)β) − βETXE − β(β+α)µ ETA−1E
−β
2(α−(n−1)β)E +
(β+α)
µ
E +AXE/2
]
.
Note that both equilibrium prices and the corresponding demand do not depend on
pd, verifying the claim in the last item. Also, notice that pd can be any vector, and so
the solution is unique up to a free choice of pd, and the statement of the first item is
verified.
G. DYNAMICS
In this section we constrain prices to remain in Region 1 of Figure 4. This yields a
coupled constraint which is a significant difference with respect to the unconstrained
model in Section 3. For this new setting, we discuss two dynamic models with multiple
content providers. Again, for ease of exposition, we restrict to the case of two CPs.
G.1. Continuous dynamics
Let us assume that the players set their prices such that the demand from each CP is
nonnegative, i.e., (7) is greater than or equal to zero for both CPs. This imposes coupled
constraints on the set of prices (ps, pc) ∈ R4 given by
d1(p
s, pc) ≥ 0, d2(ps, pc) ≥ 0,
ps1 + p
d
1 ≥ 0, ps2 + pd2 ≥ 0,
pc1 − pd1 + pa1 ≥ 0, pc2 − pd2 + pa2 ≥ 0.
Let R denote the set of prices that satisfy these constraints. It is easy to verify that the
above constraints also result in the following upper bounds on the prices:
ps1 ≤ D0α−β + pa1 − pd1, ps2 ≤
D0
α− β + p
a
2 − pd2
pc1 ≤ D0α−β + pd1, pc2 ≤
D0
α− β + p
d
2,
and thus the set R is compact. Furthermore, due to the linearity of the constraints in
the prices, R is convex. As argued in Section 3, for any price vector p = (ps, pc) ∈ R,
the mappings UISP(·, pc), UCP,1(ps, ·, ps2) and UCP,1(ps, pc1, ·) are concave functions in the
“·” variables.
Given the concave utility functions defined on the coupled constraint set R, we are
in the setting of n-person concave games studied by Rosen [Rosen 1965]. We can then
directly use the dynamic model proposed by Rosen [Rosen 1965, Sec. 4]. In our game
setting the system of differential equations for the strategies ps1, p
s
2, p
c
1, p
c
2 is:
dps1
dt
=
∂UISP(p
s, pc)
∂ps1
+ u1(p)
∂d1(p)
∂ps1
+ u2(p)
∂d2(p)
∂ps1
+ u3(p)
dps2
dt
=
∂UISP(p
s, pc)
∂ps2
+ u1(p)
∂d1(p)
∂ps2
+ u2(p)
∂d2(p)
∂ps2
+ u4(p)
dpc1
dt
=
∂UCP,1(p
s, pc)
∂pc1
+ u1(p)
∂d1(p)
∂pc1
+ u2(p)
∂d2(p)
∂pc1
+ u5(p)
dpc2
dt
=
∂UCP,2(p
s, pc)
∂pc2
+ u1(p)
∂d1(p)
∂pc2
+ u2(p)
∂d2(p)
∂pc2
+ u6(p).
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In the above dynamics it is assumed that a central agent computes u(p) =
(u1(p), . . . , u6(p)) as in [Rosen 1965, eqn. (4.5)] and communicates the values to the
players. The above dynamics tend to an equilibrium as is established next.
THEOREM 8. Let α > β. Starting from any point p ∈ R, the continuous solution p(t)
to the above system of differential equations remains in R for all t and converges to the
unique equilibrium point.
PROOF. The first claim follows directly from Rosen’s [Rosen 1965, Th. 7]. To prove
the second part, we verify the so-called diagonal strict concavity property of
σ(p) = UISP(p) + UCP,1(p) + UCP,2(p), p ∈ R.
Let g(p) denote the gradient of σ(p) given by
g(p) =


∂UISP(p)/∂p
s
1
∂UISP(p)/∂p
s
2
∂UCP,1(p)/∂p
c
1
∂UCP,2(p)/∂p
c
2

 .
With τ := β/α, the Jacobian G(p) of the above matrix can be verified to be the symmet-
ric matrix
G(p) = −α


2 −2τ 1 −τ
−2τ 2 −τ 1
1 −τ 2 −τ
−τ 1 −τ 2

 .
It is easy to see that the eigenvalues of −G(p)/α are
((3τ + 4)±
√
(3τ + 4)2 − 4(τ2 + 4τ + 3))/2
((4− 3τ)±
√
(4− 3τ)2 − 4(τ2 − 4τ + 3))/2,
and that these eigenvalues are strictly positive for τ ∈ [0, 1). G(p) is therefore negative
definite. By [Rosen 1965, Th. 6], σ(p) is diagonally strictly concave, and by [Rosen 1965,
Th. 9], the equilibrium point is globally asymptotically stable for the system of differ-
ential equations; this establishes convergence.
G.2. Discrete dynamics
In this subsection we study discrete dynamics motivated by the best response dynam-
ics. We assume the providers set their price, say, at the beginning of each day, as the
best response to prices set by the other players on the previous day.
Let pt = ((p
s
1t, p
s
2t), p
c
1t, p
c
2t) denote the price set by the players on day t. Recalling
the concavity properties of the utility functions, the price set by the players on day
m = t+ 1 are obtained by setting
∂UISP((p
s
1m, p
s
2m), p
c
1t, p
c
2t)/∂p
s
1 = 0 (76)
∂UISP((p
s
1m, p
s
2m), p
c
1t, p
c
2t)/∂p
s
2 = 0 (77)
∂UCP,1((p
s
1t, p
s
2t), p
c
1m, p
c
2t)/∂p
c
1 = 0 (78)
∂UCP,2((p
s
1t, p
s
2t), p
c
1t, p
c
2m)/∂p
s
2 = 0. (79)
The ISP controls the price (ps1m, p
s
2m) and sets them so that both (76) and (77) are si-
multaneously satisfied. The above conditions straightforwardly result in the following
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equations:
2αps1m − 2βps2m = D0 − αpc1t + βpc2t − αpd1 + βpd2
2αps2m − 2βps1m = D0 − αpc2t + βpc1t − αpd2 + βpd1
2αpc1m = D0 − αps1t + βps2t + βpc2t − α(pa1 − pd1)
2αpc2m = D0 − αps2t + βps1t + βpc1t − α(pa2 − pd2).
This is a linear mapping that can be compactly written in the matrix form as
pTt+1 = Xp
T
t + Y (80)
where, with τ = β/α, we take
X =
1
2


0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 −1
−1 τ 0 τ
τ −1 τ 0

 , Y =


D0−(α−β)p
d
1
2(α−β)
D0−(α−β)p
d
2
2(α−β)
D0−α(p
a
1−p
d
1)
2α
D0−α(p
a
2−p
d
2)
2α

 .
An easy guess of the fixed point to the iteration in (80) is
pTopt = (I −X)−1Y. (81)
Under the assumptions of Theorem 3 for two CPs (n = 2), it can be verified that pTopt is
the solution of that theorem given in (60). Under the same assumptions, the dynamics
converge to that solution, as guaranteed next.
THEOREM 9. For τ ∈ [0, 1), the dynamics given in (80) converges to the fixed point
pTopt = (I −X)−1Y .
PROOF. The eigenvalues of the matrix X can be straightforwardly evaluated; they
are
τ
2 ±
√
( τ2 )
2 + 1− τ
2
and
− τ2 ±
√
( τ2 )
2 − 1− τ
2
.
For τ ∈ [0, 1), these eigenvalues are nonzero, of magnitudes strictly smaller than 1, dis-
tinct, and hence X is diagonalizable in the form X = UDU−1, where D is the diagonal
matrix of eigenvalues and U is an invertible matrix.X is also invertible. Consequently,
pTopt in (81) is well-defined and satisfies
pTopt = Xp
T
opt + Y.
Using this and (80), with pT0 as the initial iterate, the norm of the error at iteration
t+ 1 telescopes as
||pTt+1 − pTopt|| = ||X(pTt − pTopt)||
= ||Xt+1(pT0 − pTopt)||
= ||(UDU−1)t+1(pT0 − pTopt)||
= ||UDt+1U−1(pT0 − pTopt)||.
Since the magnitudes of the eigenvalues are strictly less than 1, the error vector con-
verges to 0 exponentially quickly in the number of iterations.
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Remarks: 1) The iterates converge if τ = β/α < 1. However, to guarantee that the so-
lution is inR, we need the other necessary and sufficient condition (A+2αIn)
−1[D0En+
Apa] to be made of strictly positive entries.
2) Even if these hold, the iterates may not remain in R due to the coupled nature
of the constraints. Strictly speaking then, the dynamics is not the best response dy-
namics. Indeed, with D0 = 200, α = 6, β = 3, p
d
1 = 10, p
d
2 = 25, p
a
1 = 45, p
a
2 = 10, it
can be see that with p0 = (19, 2, 25, 28) when demand for both contents is positive,
we get p1 = (15.8333, 6.8333,−2.8333, 34.1667) where demand for CP 1 content alone is
positive. Nevertheless, the iterates converge to the unique equilibrium with strictly
positive demands.
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